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by trade costs in knowledge spill-overs processes and in determining the result of the conflict
between standard fixed-technology centripetal and centripetal forces.
6 Conclusion
The model we develop in the first part of this paper can be considered as a generalization of the
Core-Periphery models by Krugman (1991b) and Krugman and Venables (1995). More precisely,
to derive both of them we have to assume that the regional technological levels are the same for the
two regions (as = an = 1). Hence, Krugman’s model corresponds to the case in which manufactur-
ing firms employ only skilled mobile workers (Imir = Hr). Krugman and Venables’ model, instead,
assume that firms employ only intermediate manufacturing varieties and immobile workers, who
correspond to unskilled workers in the present model (Imir = L
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For given technological levels, we find that full agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in a
region is unsustainable for high trade costs because centrifugal forces are stronger than centripetal
ones. By contrast, full agglomeration may be an equilibrium for low trade costs. Moreover, the
introduction of two types of workers, characterized by different mobility assumptions, allows us
to show that the existence of an immobile factor may give rise to a non-monotonic relationship
between the sustainability of agglomeration and the levels of trade costs. In fact, we may encounter
the ∩-shaped relationship found by Venables (1996) when parameter values are such that the wages
of unskilled workers are higher in the region in which the agglomeration of the modern sector takes
place.21 When this is so, the existence of an immobile factor may lead to the dispersion of the
economic activity for high level of integration because firms find it profitable to produce in the
periphery where the wages of unskilled workers are lower than in the core region. However, we
show that this happens only if the technological advantage of the core region is not too large, and
if the wages of unskilled workers in the core are too high in relation to the technological gap.
For given equal technological levels, we find that the traditional result of a stable symmetric
21 In particular, this may happen when the share of consumers’ expenditure on manufactures µc is higher than
the threshold value µ∗c .
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equilibrium for high trade costs holds. Moreover, we show that when the technological advantage
of a region is very high with respect to the other region, full agglomeration of manufacturing in
the leading region is sustainable even for the highest values of trade costs.
When we allow for technological change and potential knowledge spill-overs, we enrich the
analysis by considering new forces that may modify the above-mentioned results obtained with
fixed-technology centripetal/centrifugal forces. More precisely, when obstacles to interacting, prox-
ied by trade costs, are high, the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable and centripetal forces
induce the agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in the more developed region. Besides, low
trade costs may yield either the agglomeration in the more productive region, or the dispersion of
the modern sector.
In particular, the symmetric equilibrium can be attained only if the lagging region can complete
a catching up process with the leading region. Hence, we show that the symmetric equilibrium is
unstable when trade costs are too high, because firms in the lagging region cannot benefit from the
potential knowledge spill-overs from the leading region. In this case, firms in the less developed
region do not have enough opportunities to interact with firms in the leading region and, therefore,
they are unable to assimilate the more productive technologies used by the latter. As a result, the
technological gap between the two regions increases, and the manufacturing sector ends up being
completely concentrated in the leading region. By contrast, when trade costs are sufficiently low,
firms in the lagging region can benefit from knowledge spill-overs and the symmetric equilibrium
may be stable if all the centripetal forces are weaker than the centrifugal ones.
Moreover, we find that, for intermediate trade costs values, the symmetric equilibrium can be
stable, provided that the initial technological gap between the two regions is not too wide. In fact,
when it is very wide, firms in the lagging region are unable to assimilate the potential knowledge
spill-overs. When this is so, the agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in the leading region
is the only sustainable equilibrium.
To sum up, there is a trade-off in the role played by trade costs in knowledge spill-over processes,
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and in determining the result of the conflict among the other fixed-technology centripetal and
centrifugal forces. The results of this trade-off depend on which of the effects produced by different
trade costs levels prevail. Particularly, if trade costs are very high, manufacturing ends up being
completely agglomerated in the region that has an initial technological advantage, because firms
in the lagging regions are unable to benefit from the interregional potential knowledge spill-overs.
Thus, we like to stress that our results reverse the usual conclusion of New Economic Geography
models that high trade costs favors economic dispersion by showing that high trade costs favor
the agglomeration of firms in the more productive region.
Appendix A. Sustainability of agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in region
v.
Agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in region v is an equilibrium if sales of a (potential)
deviant firm relocating in region r are less than the level required to break even, that is if:
Qmir < Q
∗
mir
Let us consider as given the regional levels of the technology ar and av.
A manufacturing firm has positive (negative) profits if its production is higher (lower) than
the amount required to break even, Q∗mir, that is given by
Q∗mir = ar
where r = s, n.
Let us consider the case in which the manufacturing sector is fully agglomerated in region v
and a firm that is a potential deviant in region r. This firm decides to start its production in
region r if the demand that it faces by producing in region r is higher than (or equal to) the
amount Q∗mir required to break even by producing in this region. The relationship between the
two regional break even quantities is:
Q∗mir =
ar
av
Q∗miv (33)
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